In a decision written by Justice Breyer the United States Supreme Court in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. reaffirmed protections for pregnant workers under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In its decision, the Court held that a pregnant worker may show disparate treatment by showing that she sought an accommodation, that the employer failed to accommodate her, but that the employer accommodated other non-pregnant employees who were "similar in their ability or inability to work." The Court further held that an employee can create a triable jury issue by providing evidence that the employer's policies prohibiting accommodation for pregnant workers impose a significant burden, and that the employer's reason for the policy are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but instead give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
Peggy Young, the appellant, worked for UPS as a delivery driver. She requested a leave of absence in order to undergo fertilization treatment. She became pregnant and during her pregnancy she was placed on lifting restrictions by her physician (she was told not to lift more than 20 pounds). UPS required employees holding Young's position to lift more than 20 pounds. Because Young could not satisfy the lifting requirement of her job, UPS forced Young to take an extended, non-paid leave of absence (she had used all of her FMLA leave). Young brought suit under Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging sex discrimination and disability discrimination.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to specify that Title VII’s “ter[m] ‘because of sex’ . . . include[s] . . . because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). It further provides that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work...." Id. (emphasis provided).
To support her claim, Young submitted evidence showing that UPS would accommodate workers injured on the job, workers suffering from disabilities as defined by the ADA, and those who had lost DOT certifications (to drive). She also submitted evidence that UPS had accommodated several individuals when they suffered disabilities that created work restrictions similar to hers.
In analyzing the plain language of the PDA, the Court rejected the parties' proposed interpretation of the Act, instead creating a new prima facie standard for claims of pregnancy discrimination, and remanded the case back to the district court and vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision granting summary judgment in favor of UPS. The Court announced the following standard:
"[A] plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause may make out a prima facie case by showing . . . that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others 'similar in their ability or inability to work.'"The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, non- discriminatory” reasons for denying her accommodation. But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (“similar in their ability or inability to work”) whom the employer accom-modates. If the employer offers an apparently “legitimate, non-discriminatory” reason for its actions, the plaintiff may in turn show that the employer’s proffered reasons are in fact pretextual."
The Court further held as follows:
"We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. Here, for example, if the facts are as Young says they are, she can show that UPS accommodates most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations. Young might also add that the fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions suggests that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate preg- nant employees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination."
The Court's decision in Young resolves a split that had developed below and provides clarification to the EEOC's recent guidance on this issue.In July, 2014 the EEOC had issued guidance providing that “[a]n employer may not refuse to treat a pregnant worker the same as other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work by relying on a policy that makes distinctions based on the source of an employee’s limitations (e.g., a policy of providing light duty only to workers injured on the job).” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §626–I(A)(5), p. 626:0009 (July 2014).
The Court's decision reaffirms a plaintiff's ability to prove disparate impact claims by circumstantial evidence, and provides clear guidance on the standard that an employee must meet to survive an employer's motion for summary judgment.
For more information about this decision, please call Stavros Law at (801) 758-7604 or visit us online at utahtriallawyers.net.
