Despite recognizing that proof of interference for an improper purpose has been the law since the Court's decision more than 30 years ago in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co.v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 307 (Utah 1982), the Court side-stepped its prior precedent, referenced the risks inherent in proving motive or purpose and the potential for causing juries to find liability too easily for "legitimate commercial activity" to justify its reversal. The Court further noted that despite its attempt to circumscribe the doctrine by allowing improper-purpose liability only where “the improper purpose predominate[s]” and by counseling that it would usually be “prudent” not to apply the doctrine to “commercial conduct," such attempts had been largely futile. Accordingly, the Court reversed its prior precedent and held that "no tortious interference claim can succeed without evidence of improper means." Eldridge, at ¶ 4. In doing so, it concluded "that the improper-purpose doctrine has not worked well in practice, and that "more good than harm will come by departing from precedent” and "should therefore be abandoned." Id. at ¶ 64 (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994)).
In Pratt v. Prodata, Inc. 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994) the Utah Supreme Court held that improper means can be shown when the plaintiff proves that the defendant's means of interference were"contrary to statutory, regulatory, or common law or violated 'an established standard of a trade or profession." Id. at 788 (citations omitted). Further in Leigh Furniture, the Court held that "[a] deliberate breach of contract, even where employed to secure economic advantage, is not, by itself, an 'improper means.'"
While the exact contours of improper means have yet to be defined in Utah, its seems clear that some violations of statutory (e.g., anti-trust laws; unfair competition laws), regulatory (e.g., licensing regulations) and common law (e.g., defamation/slander) would be sufficient to show an improper means. It is not clear that all such violations would meet this requirement. Recognizing this lack of development, the Court noted that in rejecting the improper purpose standard, it does not mean that
"defendants’ motives and intent are entirely irrelevant to tortious interference claims. Eldridge, at ¶65. Instead, it suggested that a defendant's motives may be relevant in two ways. First, motives may shed light on intent. Id. at ¶66. Second, motives may be relevant to showing improper means by, for example, reference to the underlying means employed. Id. at ¶66 However, "it will never be the defendant’s motivation by itself that leads to liability." Id. And, importantly, "a person who violates no legal duties, infringes no one’s rights, and commits no wrongful action can never be held liable for malice alone. Id. at ¶69.
If you have additional questions about the Court's decision, or this cause of action in Utah, please contact one of the lawyers at Stavros Law P.C., 801-758-7604, for additional information.
