US Supreme Court Issues Important Decision Affirming Accommodation Rights for Pregnant Employees

In a decision written by Justice Breyer the United States Supreme Court in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. reaffirmed protections for pregnant workers under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  In its decision, the Court held that a pregnant worker may show disparate treatment by showing that she sought an accommodation, that the employer failed to accommodate her, but that the employer accommodated other non-pregnant employees who were "similar in their ability or inability to work." The Court further held that an employee can create a triable jury issue by providing evidence that the employer's policies prohibiting accommodation for pregnant workers impose a significant burden, and that the employer's reason for the policy are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but instead give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.

Peggy Young, the appellant, worked for UPS as a delivery driver.  She requested a leave of absence in order to undergo fertilization treatment. She became pregnant and during her pregnancy she was placed on lifting restrictions by her physician (she was told not to lift more than 20 pounds).  UPS required employees holding Young's position to lift more than 20 pounds. Because Young could not satisfy the lifting requirement of her job, UPS forced Young to take an extended, non-paid leave of absence (she had used all of her FMLA leave). Young brought suit under Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging sex discrimination and disability discrimination.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to specify that Title VII’s “ter[m] ‘because of sex’ . . . include[s] . . . because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). It further provides that  “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work...." Id. (emphasis provided).

To support her claim, Young submitted evidence showing that UPS would accommodate workers injured on the job, workers suffering from disabilities as defined by the ADA, and those who had lost DOT certifications (to drive). She also submitted evidence that UPS had accommodated several individuals when they suffered disabilities that created work restrictions similar to hers. 

In analyzing the plain language of the PDA, the Court rejected the parties' proposed interpretation of the Act, instead creating a new prima facie standard for claims of pregnancy discrimination, and remanded the case back to the district court and vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision granting summary judgment in favor of UPS.  The Court announced the following standard:

"[A] plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause may make out a prima facie case by showing . . . that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others 'similar in their ability or inability to work.'"The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, non- discriminatory” reasons for denying her accommodation. But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (“similar in their ability or inability to work”) whom the employer accom-modates.  If the employer offers an apparently “legitimate, non-discriminatory” reason for its actions, the plaintiff may in turn show that the employer’s proffered reasons are in fact pretextual."

The Court further held as follows: 

"We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. Here, for example, if the facts are as Young says they are, she can show that UPS accommodates most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations. Young might also add that the fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions suggests that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate preg- nant employees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination."

The Court's decision in Young resolves a split that had developed below and provides clarification to the EEOC's recent guidance on this issue.In July, 2014 the EEOC had issued guidance providing that “[a]n employer may not refuse to treat a pregnant worker the same as other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work by relying on a policy that makes distinctions based on the source of an employee’s limitations (e.g., a policy of providing light duty only to workers injured on the job).” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §626–I(A)(5), p. 626:0009 (July 2014). 

The Court's decision reaffirms a plaintiff's ability to prove disparate impact claims by circumstantial evidence, and provides clear guidance on the standard that an employee must meet to survive an employer's motion for summary judgment.  

For more information about this decision, please call Stavros Law at (801) 758-7604 or visit us online at utahtriallawyers.net. 

Proving or Defending Against Age Discrimination Claims in the Workplace

Employees and employers are often confronted with claims of age discrimination in the workplace. Most studies indicate that age discrimination is a real presence in today's workforce. This form of employment discrimination is illegal under a number of different circumstances and in different settings. Unfortunately, age discrimination can be uniquely difficult to prove. Thankfully, there are a number of ways in which you can aid your attorney in helping to back up your claim with solid evidence. If you hope to prove that you are being discriminated against because of your age at work, it is imperative that you let your attorney know if any of the following scenarios have occurred in regards to your situation.

1) statements made to you or directed at you that include age-based comments, or that can be inferred as being age-based;

2) evidence that you were treated differently than those younger than you with respect to the terms, conditions and privileges of employment;

3) evidence that you have been excluded from training, company social events and co-worker lunches due to your age;

4) evidence that you've been denied privileges granted to younger employees, including assignments. allocation of work and work projects, travel, etc.;

5) statements made to you or directed at you regarding your retirement or your longevity at work;

If any of the above factors are present, it would be wise to contact an age discrimination lawyer with experience in bring claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), or similar state law provisions, such as the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1964. In addition, if you are being targeted because of the costs of benefits to you because of your age, or because of the additional premiums associated with your health care or related benefits, you should speak to a lawyer. In some cases, you may also have claims under Section 510 of ERISA.







Age discrimination may be difficult to prove, but it is certainly not impossible to do so. If you suspect that you are being discriminated against at work and may have proof of such treatment, please do not hesitate to speak with an experienced employment law attorney who can help you navigate your legal options.


Please call us at (801) 758-7604, or contact us online at www.utahtriallawyers.net to discuss your situation.

Utah Legislature Passes Landmark Anti-discrimination Bill Providing Protections For Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

On March 12, 2015 the Utah Legislature passed a landmark discrimination bill extending protections in Utah's Antidiscrimination Act of 1965 to sexual orientation and gender identity.  The bill has been recognized across the United States as a progressive step toward balancing the competing interests of the LGBT community with religious expression.  

The bill amends the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965 and Utah's Fair Housing Act to provide protections to the LGBT community.  While the bill sidestepped the issue of whether private business owners, based on truly held religious beliefs, may refuse services to to homosexuals, it provides clear protections for employees against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.

The bill modified Utah Code Ann. Section 34A-5-106 to prohibit discrimination in the terms, privileges and conditions of employment, or the hiring, promotion, demotion or termination of an employee because of the employee's gender identity or sexual orientation. Sexual orientation is defined to mean "an individual's actual or perceived orientation as heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual.  Gender identity is tied to the DSM 5 and can be established through medical history, or other evidence that gender identity is "sincerely held", part of a person's core identity and not being asserted for an improper purpose.

The bill provides protections to employees who express religious or moral beliefs and commitments in the workplace in "a reasonable, non-disruptive, and non-harassing way" on "equal terms with similar types of expression of beliefs or commitments allowed by the employer in the workplace." It further prohibits employers from taking adverse action against an employee for "lawful expression or expressive activity outside of the workplace regarding the person's religious, political or personal convictions" concerning marriage, family or sexuality, unless such expression directly conflicts with the essential business related interests of the employer. It further exempts religious leaders and religious organizations from these protections, as well as the Boy Scouts of America.

In addition, the bill provides the same protections under Utah's Fair Housing Act, Utah Code Ann Section 57-21-6, extending protections to discriminatory housing practices to include sexual orientation and gender identity.

For additional information concerning the new protections afforded to employees and residents on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as the exceptions to such protections, and express protections for religious freedoms, please call (801) 758 7604, or contact us online at utahtriallawyers.net.